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Incorporating Human Readiness Levels at Sandia National Laboratories
Judi E. See, Jason Morris, Richard Craft, Michael Moulton, and Steven M. Trujillo
Sandia National Laboratories

Abstract
Since 2010, the concept of human readiness levels has been under development as a possible supplement to the existing technology
readiness level (TRL) scale. The intent is to provide a mechanism to address safety and performance risks associated with the human
component in a system that parallels the TRL structure already familiar to the systems engineering community. Sandia National
Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, initiated a study in 2015 to evaluate options to incorporate human readiness planning for
Sandia processes and products. The study team has collected the majority of baseline assessment data and has conducted interviews to
understand staff perceptions of four different options for human readiness planning. Preliminary results suggest that all four options may
have a vital role, depending on the type of work performed and the phase of product development. Upon completion of data collection, the
utility of identified solutions will be assessed in one or more test cases.
Keywords:
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Technology Readiness Levels
Technology readiness levels (TRLs) represent a common tool to measure technology maturity that provides
consistency within and across programs. The TRL concept can be traced back to as early as 1969, and the first published
description appeared in 1989 (Sadin, Povinelli, & Rosen, 1989). At that time, the U.S. National Space Policy directed
a broader role for NASA in the technology maturation process to drive technology advances for future mission
capabilities. Development of the initial seven-level TRL scale was prompted by NASA’s realization that the differences
between success and failure in the past were directly attributable to the adequacy of technology readiness. The explicitly
defined readiness levels in the TRL scale provided a precise means of describing the maturity of a technology and its
readiness for operational use.
The Department of Defense (DOD) fully adopted a nine-level TRL scale in 1999 when the General Accounting Office
(1999) concluded that demonstrating high maturity before including new technologies in development programs increases
the chances of success. Since that time, the DOD has fully incorporated TRLs into its acquisition framework. Technology
development begins upon Milestone A approval; afterwards, formal readiness assessments of the technology under
development are required at Milestones B and C and as otherwise directed by the milestone decision authority (Department
of Defense, 2011) (Figure 1). For major defense acquisition programs, TRL 6 is required before Milestone B approval
(Department of Defense, 2012). TRLs are now widely accepted and used not only throughout the DOD but also at other
U.S. government agencies such as the Department of Energy and many companies worldwide. At Sandia National
Laboratories, the process and rationale for assessing a product’s TRL are described in an internal document referred to as
Realize Product Procedure (RPP) #22.
The nine levels of the TRL scale describe various stages of technology maturity, beginning with the initial stages of
scientific investigation at TRL 1 and culminating in successful operational use of the final system at TRL 9. In general, all
sites use the same basic descriptors for each of the nine TRLs (Sandia’s descriptions appear in Table 1), but they may be
supplemented with more specific descriptions tailored to products and missions. Each level of the scale has associated exit
criteria describing the conditions that must be met before the technology can advance to the next level. For example, TRL 3
indicates that concepts have been demonstrated analytically or experimentally. In order to exit TRL 3 and advance to TRL 4,
analytical models or laboratory prototypes must demonstrate the proof-of-concept for the key elements of intended applications.
As part of meeting this exit criterion, descriptions of the functionality of intended applications must be developed.
Limitations of Technology Readiness Levels
The TRL scale offers many benefits. It provides a simple indicator of a technology’s maturity that is readily understood. It can
be used to gauge progress throughout development and manage program risks. However, the TRL scale does have limitations.
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Figure 1. TRLs in the DOD acquisition framework. For major defense acquisition programs, TRL 6 is required before Milestone B approval
(Department of Defense, 2012).
Table 1
Sandia National Laboratories TRL descriptions.
TRL Descriptions
9:
8:
7:
6:
5:
4:
3:
2:
1:

Operational use of deliverable
Actual deliverable qualified through test and demonstration
Final development version of the deliverable demonstrated in
operational environment
Representative of the deliverable demonstrated in relevant
environments
Key elements demonstrated in relevant environments
Key elements demonstrated in laboratory environment
Concepts demonstrated analytically or experimentally
Concept and application formulated
Basic principles observed and reported

Namely, the TRL definitions combine several different
aspects of technology readiness into a single metric; in
effect, the scale represents technology maturity as a single
dimension. Such limitations have spawned the development of multiple other types of readiness level scales to
fill the gaps, including manufacturing, design, integration, and system readiness levels.
Another gap that has been identified in the TRL scale is
its inability to capture the human-related aspects of technology development and their critical role in the readiness
of a technology for operational use. A system is comprised
of both technological and human components that must
interact successfully within the environment in order to
achieve system effectiveness. Failures originating from any
one component of the system can negatively impact overall
system effectiveness. While the TRL scale provides assurance that the technological components of the system will
function as intended, it does not address the interactions
between the technologies and the humans in the system
that are necessary for success. That is, a technology may be
mature in a strictly technical sense; however, if it is not
ready for people to use effectively, then its overall readiness for deployment could be much lower.
Human Issues in Engineered Systems
Along with this recognition of a gap in the TRL scale is
the growing realization that most of the problems in engineered systems stem from the people in the system, not the

technologies. Human error is said to be a major causative
factor in many domains—up to 45% of nuclear power plant
accidents, 60% of aircraft accidents, 80% of NASA Type
A/B mishaps, and 90% of road traffic accidents are attributable to human error (NASA Armstrong Flight Research
Center, 2017; Pheasant, 1991). People typically make 3
to 7 errors per hour under normal conditions and up to
15 errors per hour in stressful, emergency, or unusual conditions—up to 15 million errors per million hours (Farris &
Richards, 2009). By contrast, a toggle switch fails once per
million hours (Smith, 2005).
To complicate matters, most current systems engineering
approaches for product development ‘‘forget’’ the human—
the largest error-generating component—in the system
(Schatz, 2016). That is, the role of people in the system and
their interfaces with the technological components receive
little to no attention throughout the development lifecycle.
More commonly, the human component is not considered
until the system is fielded and human errors start to occur.
Given that costs to fix errors escalate exponentially over the
product lifecycle, it can be 30 to 1500 times more costly to
correct an error at the operations and maintenance phase as
compared to a design flaw detected and corrected early in
the development process (Steicklein et al., 2004).
Human Readiness Levels
In an effort to address these concerns, several researchers
have been exploring the utility of supplementing TRLs with
another type of readiness scale—human readiness levels
(HRLs) (Endsley, 2014; Kosnik & Acosta, 2010; O’Neil,
2014; Phillips, 2010). The intent is to afford equal weight to
the technologies and the humans within the system and to
‘‘remember’’ the human early and often throughout the lifecycle. The central question underlying HRLs is whether the
technology is ready for human use. In other words, have the
features necessary for usability and operator effectiveness
been engineered into the design as early as possible?
Acosta (2010) first introduced the concept of a HRL
scale during a panel discussion at the Aerospace Medical
Association annual meeting in Phoenix. Afterwards, he
served as an advisor for a Naval Postgraduate School thesis
in which a framework for a nine-level HRL scale was
formally developed (Phillips, 2010). Mica Endsley, Chief
Scientist of the Air Force from 2013 to 2015, began
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Table 2
Proposed HRL scale (Endsley, 2015).
HRL Descriptions
9: Post-deployment and sustainment of human performance capability
8: Human performance using system fully tested, validated, and
approved in mission operations
7: HSI requirements verified through development test and evaluation in
representative environment
6: System design fully matured by human performance analyses, metrics,
and prototyping
5: HSI demonstration and early user evaluation of initial prototypes to
inform design
4: Modeling and analysis of human performance conducted and applied
within system concept
3: Mapping of human interactions and application of standards to proof
of concept
2: Human capabilities and limitations and system affordances and
constraints applied to preliminary designs
1: Human-focused concept of operations defined
Note. HSI 5 human systems integration.

advocating the nine-level HRL scale and maintained that it
should be as much of a requirement as the TRL scale for
system development (Endsley, 2014). Table 2 shows the
proposed HRL scale that Endsley (2015) presented at the
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Human
Systems Conference in 2015.
Understanding HRLs
The unique contributions of HRLs for product development can be understood in part by considering how they
can augment existing TRLs. Returning to an example presented earlier in this paper, TRL 3 focuses on advancing the
maturity of the technical components of a system through
analytical models or laboratory prototypes. If human readiness were to be addressed simultaneously with TRL 3, the
development team would also concentrate on how humans
interact with the technical components. For example, the
team might investigate and clarify the nature of the human
roles for the intended applications identified in this phase—
inspector, monitor, maintainer—and the implications for
the specific technical components that have been selected.
Similarly, the team would examine whether the features of
the laboratory prototypes that have been developed account
for human capabilities and limitations. Examples might
include verifying that the planned displays are compatible
with human visual capabilities or that the knobs and
switches on control panels are within reach of the intended
users.
The contributions of HRLs can also be understood by
examining the consequences of neglecting human readiness
during development. The U.S. Army Stinger missile system
provides one example. The shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile
system was designed to support a required probability of kill
of 0.6 for low-flying enemy aircraft. The system presumably
advanced through all required TRL levels, and it was initially

deployed in 1981. During fielding, it was discovered that the
actual probability of kill was much lower at 0.3. It became
apparent that operator training and skill were critical factors
in successful use of the Stinger missile. An Army study found
the Stinger was unnecessarily difficult and, with 18 separate
steps needed to fire it, too complicated for many soldiers
(Tully, 1986). The critical error that occurred during design
involved an assumption throughout the development process
that soldier performance would be perfect (Booher, 2003).
The issue could have been addressed early in the design
process by expanding the definition of ‘‘system probability of
kill’’ beyond the strictly mechanical components of the system
to include the concept of ‘‘human readiness’’ for the human
component.
Potential Benefits of HRLs
HRLs are intended to mitigate program risk, improve
system performance (minimize failures), and reduce lifecycle costs. As described earlier, the human is the largest
error-generating component of a system. Addressing the
readiness of technological components of a system for human
use early and often can reduce program risks, lifecycle costs,
and system failures. For a typical system, approximately 90%
of total lifecycle costs are determined at the end of the research
and development phase, and the majority of those costs
are associated with subsequent operations and maintenance
(Schatz, 2016). Thus, for a typical system, total lifecycle costs
are determined at a point when the human component has not
been considered. As a result, a large portion of the already
high operations and maintenance costs is spent to correct
human error issues. Focusing on human readiness throughout
the lifecycle helps satisfactorily address risk, cost, and system
performance simultaneously.
Status of HRL Development
The HRL scale has been intentionally designed to
parallel the TRL structure familiar to the systems engineering community to facilitate integration into current approaches
for product development. While there has been interest and
continued effort in developing the HRL concept, the scale
has yet to be formally adopted and used (Ganey, Garcia, &
Wilbert, 2017). One issue is current DOD feedback, which
suggests reluctance to introduce yet another readiness scale.
As a result, more recent DOD efforts have begun to explore
options that retain the critical concepts embedded in an
HRL scale, but focus more heavily on tools to support
performance- and risk-based assessments of human readiness (Stohr, 2016). Human systems integration (HSI) risk
tools like Stohr’s are intended to facilitate communications regarding the program risks stemming from insufficient human readiness as well as the consequences of
those risks not being addressed during development (e.g.,
degraded system performance, safety, cost, schedule).
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Suggested mitigation strategies to address the identified
risks are also incorporated. A standard risk matrix illustrating the likelihood and consequences of each risk may be
used to facilitate communications with program managers.
Sandia HRL Study
Sandia National Laboratories initiated a study in 2015 to
evaluate options to incorporate human readiness planning
tailored to Sandia processes and products. One driver for
the study involves the inherent differences between the
DOD acquisition process and Sandia’s product development process. Similarities between the two approaches are
reflected in the general progression of activities during the
development lifecycle. As in the DOD acquisition framework, development of Sandia products progresses from
initial concept development (Phase 1) through full quantity
production, maintenance, and evaluation (Phase 6). Given
that full system production for the systems of interest
at Sandia has already occurred, current development processes consist of refurbishment and maintenance of existing
systems produced in Phase 6 to achieve life extension or
enhanced system capabilities (e.g., design modifications for
existing components). This modified development process
falls entirely within lifecycle Phase 6 and is therefore referred to as the ‘‘6.X process.’’ Figure 2 illustrates the linkage
between Sandia’s 6.X development process and TRLs
(Sandia National Laboratories, 2015).
Study Scope
Bearing in mind these differences, the present study
capitalizes to the extent possible on previous DOD research
by leveraging the lessons that have already been learned to
facilitate a study approach. The scope of the Sandia study
includes an initial baseline assessment to understand in
detail how various organizations within the laboratories
conduct product development now. The intent of the baseline assessment is to explore the requirements that guide
product development, the resources that are used (e.g.,
documents and subject matter experts), and the extent of
any gap that may exist at present in addressing the human
component of the system. Accordingly, the study team
interviewed personnel who work in multiple different groups
throughout Sandia to represent the range of development
activities.
While completing the baseline assessment, the study
team also gauged staff views of four different options that

might be implemented to prompt human readiness assessments. Interviewees were also given an opportunity to identify other options. The study team developed and presented
the following four options:
1. Separate HRL scale: this concept launched the study.
The study team chose to include use of a separate HRL
scale as one option, recognizing that DOD reservations
about adding another readiness scale might or might
not be reflected at Sandia.
2. TRL+ scale: represents a proposed modification to the
existing TRL scale to incorporate human readiness
concepts directly into the definition of technology
maturity. The intent is to add HRL concepts to existing
exit criteria for each TRL, and developers must meet
both types of criteria before advancing to the next TRL
level. This option would obviate the need to add a new
readiness level scale.
3. Human factors RPP: a proposed Sandia document
that would characterize how human factors products
would be developed during HSI activities to evaluate
readiness of a product for human use. References to
the human factors RPP would then be incorporated
into existing RPPs that govern the design and development process to ensure that HRL-type concepts are
included systematically and comprehensively throughout the process.
4. HSI risk tool: a tool similar to Stohr’s (2016) proposed HSI risk tool to help HSI practitioners quickly
develop and communicate programmatic risks stemming from the human component of a system as well
as possible mitigation strategies for those risks.
Preliminary Results
The study team is continuing to collect data from staff
interviews to address the study objectives. To date, collected data suggest that current baseline approaches for
Sandia product design and development tend to neglect the
human component of a system. For the most part, interviewees have indicated that coordination with follow-on
manufacturers early in the process constitutes HSI. Aside
from that form of pre-planning and coordination, little else
is routinely accomplished to manage the human component
of a system. If the human component is addressed in some
fashion during design and development, the engineering
team rarely consults human factors professionals for input.
Furthermore, only a small minority of the staff who have

Figure 2. Recommended minimum TRLs in the Sandia product development framework.
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been interviewed at this point have completed Sandia’s
internal human factors course or undertaken another type
of human dimension training. In addition, current product
requirements do not typically include specific human performance requirements for effectiveness or efficiency, though
some teams actively derive them from more generic, higherlevel requirements for their own purposes.
Reactions to the four options for systematic and comprehensive incorporation of the human component throughout development have shown some variability, depending
on where people work within Sandia and the type of work
they perform. Overall, however, a fairly consistent picture
has begun to emerge. In general, all four options have
proponents, but the contributions and value of each option
are contingent on the phase of product development. Each
option addresses different questions and provides different
types of information. At this stage in data collection, responses appear to favor implementation of either a separate
HRL scale or a TRL+ scale, supplemented with a human
factors RPP to provide overarching guidance and requirements. Critics of a separate HRL scale have pointed out
that it may not be well received due to the perception of
imposing more requirements on their already extensive list
of obligations. Critics of the TRL+ scale pointed out that
TRLs and HRLs will not likely progress in parallel for
every product, which will make it difficult to determine
how to assign HRLs to existing TRL exit criteria.
Finally, interviewees who have responded positively to
the concept of an HSI risk tool state that it conforms to
many current risk-informed approaches used throughout
Sandia. In fact, risk management is a central feature of project management. Consequently, an HSI risk tool might be
readily accepted as part of common practice rather than
viewed as yet another requirement that must be met.
Staff also posited some options the study team had not
previously considered, primarily as secondary aids. For
example, one suggestion is to add human factors training
to current internal training and professional development
requirements for systems and component engineers. At
present, engineers are not required to complete any human
factors courses offered at Sandia. Along these lines, another
suggestion is to provide human factors training for personnel in higher-level executive roles to achieve a topdown understanding of the criticality of a development
process that includes the human component of a system.
A third suggestion is to circulate a human factors lessons
learned newsletter periodically to promote more widespread awareness of the impacts of human factors throughout the product lifecycle.
Future Efforts
Future efforts for this study consist of completing
staff interviews and developing a comprehensive approach
that incorporates interviewee inputs and suggestions.

Afterwards, the utility of this approach will be tested with up
to three test cases to capture a range of early-, mid-, and latephase development efforts. The test cases will help identify
and refine the optimal approach that will be recommended to Sandia management as a path forward to achieve
systematic and comprehensive human readiness planning,
regardless of the specific program or product.
Summary and Conclusions
Sandia National Laboratories has identified a need for an
approach to bridge the gap between the current technologycentric systems engineering approach and the desired
end state of full incorporation of the human component
throughout the product lifecycle. Sandia leveraged DOD
research and lessons learned in this arena to inform a study
approach, recognizing that solutions that work for the DOD
may not be optimal for Sandia’s missions. The objective
is to provide a recommended path forward to ensure a
balanced systems engineering approach that gives equal
weight to the technologies and the humans in the system
throughout the product lifecycle.
To date, the study team has collected the majority of the
baseline assessment data and has conducted interviews to
understand staff perceptions of various options for incorporating the human dimension throughout the product
lifecycle. Collected data have confirmed a gap in Sandia’s
current design and development process with respect to
consideration of the human component of the system. Further, all of the proposed options to fully address the human
component during design and development appear to have
vital contributions, depending on the type of work performed and the phase of product development. Upon completion of data collection, the study team’s next task is to
effectively combine the feedback into a coherent approach
that can be tested for utility. Test cases will be used to
finalize an approach to achieve a balanced systems engineering process that affords equal consideration to the
technologies and the humans in the system throughout the
lifecycle.
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